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Abstract
There is presented a contextual statistical model of the proba-
bilistic description of physical reality. Here contexts (complexes of
physical conditions) are considered as basic elements of reality. There
is discussed the relation with QM. We propose a realistic analogue of
Bohr’s principle of complementarity. In the opposite to the Bohr’s
principle, our principle has no direct relation with mutual exclusivity
for observables. To distinguish our principle from the Bohr’s prin-
ciple and to give better characterization, we change the terminology
and speak about supplementarity, instead of complementarity. Sup-
plementarity is based on the interference of probabilities. It has quan-
titative expression trough a coefficient which can be easily calculated
from experimental statistical data. We need not appeal to the Hilbert
space formalism and noncommutativity of operators representing ob-
servables. Moreover, in our model there exists pairs of supplementary
observables which can not be represented in the complex Hilbert space.
There are discussed applications of the principle of supplementarity
outside quantum physics.
Keywords: contextual statistical realistic model, interference of
probabilities, complementarity, supplementarity.
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1 Introduction
Since the creation of statistical mechanics, the probabilistic approach
has always played a fundamental role in physics. A crucial step in
the development of the statistical approach to physics was made in
the process of creation of quantum mechanics. It was however soon
realized by the founders of this new theory that quantum formalism
could not provide a description of physical processes for individual
systems. The understanding of this surprising fact induced numerous
debates on the possibilities of individual and probabilistic descrip-
tions, and on the relation between them. The debates that followed
were characterized by a wide diversity of opinions on the origin of
quantum randomness and on its relation to classical randomness, see,
e.g., Ref. 1–38 for details and bibliography. Nowadays a rather com-
mon opinion is that the classical probabilistic model is incompatible
with the quantum one. This opinion is based on a number of “no-go”
theorems (von Neumann, Kochen-Specker, Bell,...). The problem can-
not however be considered totally clarified since the problem of corre-
spondence between quantum and classical probabilistic models is not a
purely mathematical problem, but a physical problem. There are var-
ious possibilities to mathematically formalize such a correspondence.
Each formalization induces its own model, which in turn usually leads
to a new proof of a “no-go” theorem. It should however be stressed
that these new “no-go” theorems suffer from the same flaw as any
other “no-go” theorem, in the sense that they cannot totally elimi-
nate the possibility of a new formalization of the quantum-classical
probabilistic correspondence.1 Of course, the question of the physical
adequacy should be treated separately.
In Refs. 29, 30 a new way to establish a correspondence between
classical and quantum probabilistic models was proposed. The crucial
point of this approach is that physical observables are described by
a contextual probabilistic model. The main quantum structures are
1At my talk at Beckman Institute, University of Urbana-Champain, I was curious: Why
did A. Einstein not pay any attention to the von Neumann “no-go theorem? A. Leggett
paid my attention to the fact that in the original German addition(5) of von Neumann’s
book(6) there was formulated not a theorem, but ansatz. So it seems that A. Einstein
considered this chain of mathematical calculations as just some arguments against hidden
variables. Moreover, it might be that it was even the position of von Neumann. It might
be that both Einstein and vo Neumann understood well that it is impossible to prove
nonexistence of prequantum deterministic model in the form of a mathematical theorem.
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present in this model in a latent form. A quantum representation of
the contextual probabilistic model can be constructed on the basis of
two specially chosen observables, a and b. We call them “reference ob-
servables” (e.g., the position and momentum); only these observables
are considered as representing objective properties of physical systems
(cf. the views of L. De Broglie, D. Bohm, especially in Ref. 12 ).
This problem can be considered in a different way, as G. Mackey(10)
did, by trying to develop a general probabilistic model M which
would contain classical and quantum probabilistic models as special
cases (see also S. Gudder(13), L. Ballentine(14)). The origin of the
main mathematical structures of quantum mechanics (e.g., the com-
plex Hilbert state space) in such a general probabilistic model should
however be clarified.
Before having a closer look at our model, it is perhaps necessary
to discuss the meaning of the term contextuality, as it can obviously
be interpreted in many different ways, see Ref. 31. The most common
meaning (especially in the literature on quantum logic(33)) is that the
outcome for a measurement of an observable u under a contextual
model is calculated using a different (albeit hidden) measure space,
depending on whether or not compatible observables v,w, ... were also
made in the same experiment(33).We remark that well known “no-go”
theorems cannot be applied to such contextual models, see Refs. 33,
37 for details.
This approach to contextuality can be considered as a mathemat-
ical formalization, see Ref. 33 , of Bohr’s measurement contextuality.
Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics is in fact considered as
contextual. For N. Bohr the word “context” had the meaning of a
“context of a measurement”, see W. De Muynck, W. De Baere, H.
Marten(38), W. De Muynck(17) and A. Plotnitsky(25−27). For instance,
in his answer to the EPR challenge N. Bohr pointed out that posi-
tion can be determined only in the context of a position measurement.
The still unsolved and persistent difficulty of any contextual model
is that the physical content of such theories appears in the current
understanding to be unanchored to what is obtained in any exper-
iment. It seems indeed difficult to explain in any satisfactory way
that a measurement on a particle s1 should or could have both a dif-
ferent meaning and a different associated measure space, depending
on wether or not another measurement on a second particle s2 was
performed.
In our approach to the problem of correspondence between classi-
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cal and quantum probabilistic models, the term contextuality is used
in a totally different meaning. Roughly speaking our approach is non-
contextual from the conventional viewpoint(33). Values associated to
the reference observables (e.g., position and momentum) are consid-
ered as objective properties of physical systems. These observables
are therefore not contextual in the sense of Bohr’s measurement con-
textuality.
The basic notion of our approach is the context – that is, a com-
plex of physical conditions. Physical systems interact with a context
C and in this process a statistical ensemble SC is formed (cf. Ref.
14, 34). The notion of context is close to the notion of preparation
procedure, see e.g. Ref. 14, 33–36. However, for any preparation
procedure E , it is assumed that this procedure could be (at least in
principle) realized experimentally. We do not assume this for an ar-
bitrary context C. Contexts are elements of physical reality which
exist independently of observers. By using the terminology of H. At-
manspacher and H. Primas(32) we can say that context belong to the
ontic level of description of physical reality and preparation procedure
to the epistemic level.
Conditional (or better to say contextual) probabilities for refer-
ence observables, P(a = y/C),P(b = x/C), are used to represent the
context C by a complex probability amplitude ψC . This amplitude is
in fact encoded in a generalization of the formula of total probability
describing the interference of probabilities. Note that interferences of
probabilities can thus be obtained in a classical probabilistic frame-
work (i.e., without the need of the Hilbert space formalism), an ob-
servation which was actually the starting point of our considerations.
As a result, we found that the quantum probabilistic model can be
considered as a Hilbert space projection of the classical contextual
probabilistic model. This projection is based on two fixed “reference
observables” a and b which play a fundamental role and determine
the correspondence between classical prequantum model and quan-
tum model.
Our approach is thus based on two cornerstones:
a) contextuality of probabilities;
b) the use of two fixed (incompatible) physical observables in order
to represent the classical contextual probabilistic model in the complex
Hilbert space.
We would like to note that the conventional quantum represen-
tation is the image of a very special class of contexts Ctr, that is of
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contexts producing the usual trigonometric interference, while other
contexts producing so called hyperbolic interference(29,30) are also pos-
sible. These contexts cannot be represented in a complex Hilbert space
but in a so called hyperbolic Hilbert space(29,30) instead – a module
over a two dimensional Clifford algebra. We will consider however in
this paper only contexts having the conventional quantum represen-
tation in a complex Hilbert space.
Our contextual statistical approach is realistic. Therefore one may
wonder how the principle of complementarity should be interpreted or
perhaps modified in such an approach. It is precisely the purpose of
this paper to study this question.
In a realistic approach one cannot just borrow Bohr’s notion of
complementarity. The main problem is that of “mutual exclusivity”
which was considered by N. Bohr as the main feature of complemen-
tarity. We recall the following formulation which was presented in Ref.
1 (vol. 2, p. 40) and was probably Bohr’s most refined formulation of
what he meant by complementary measurement situations:
Evidence obtained under different experimental conditions [e.g. those
of the position vs. the momentum measurement] cannot be compre-
hended within a single picture, but must be regarded as [mutually ex-
clusive and] complementary in the sense that only the totality of the
[observable] phenomena exhausts the possible information about the
[quantum] objects [themselves].
An extended analysis of Bohr’s views to complementarity can be
found in works of A. Plotnitsky(25−27).
Let us consider a realistic model; let a and b be two observables.
Then, for any physical system ω, the values a(ω) and b(ω) are simul-
taneously well defined (they “coexist”). In such a situation it is rather
unappropriate to talk about the mutual exclusivity of the a-property
and the b-property for a system ω. Bohr’s principle of complementar-
ity should therefore be modified to retain its part related to comple-
tion (in the sense of addition of new information) and to exclude its
part related to mutual exclusivity. Hence, in order to distinguish our
contextual statistical realistic complementarity from Bohr’s comple-
mentarity, we propose to change the terminology and use the term
supplementarity, instead of complementarity.2
2We understand that the change of terminology, especially for such a fundamental prin-
ciple of nature, is a very risky choice. It might be better to use a less radical terminology,
such as Va¨xjo¨ principle of complementarity for instance. However, since for most physi-
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In our approach the principle of complementarity-supplementarity
is formulated in mathematical terms. There exist pairs of observ-
ables a and b such that b/a-conditioning or a/b-conditioning produces
supplementary information. For such observables probabilities inter-
fere producing nontrivial disturbances of the classical formula of total
probability. We consider this feature of the contextual statistical re-
alistic model as the principle of supplementarity, or to put it in other
words, as the probabilistic principle of complementarity.
We recall that in the case of two dichotomous random variables
a = α1, α2 and b = β1, β2 the classical formula of total proabbility, see
e.g. [39], pp. 25, 77, has the form:
P(b = βi) = P(a = α1)P(b = βi/a = α1)+P(a = α2)P(b = βi/a = α2).
As was already emphasized, in the opposition to Bohr’s comple-
mentarity, supplementarity has no direct relation with mutual exclu-
sivity (however, see section 7 for more details). Moreover, supplemen-
tary observables a and b need not present a complete set of data in a
context C. In our approach, representations of reality (e.g., physical
reality) based on pairs of supplementary observables a and b are in gen-
eral not complete. Pairs of supplementary observables produce very
rough (statistical) images of the underlying reality (cf. with fuzzy-
viewpoint to Quantum Mechanics, see, e.g., Busch, Grabowski and
Lahti(34), Gudder, O. Pulmanova(28)). In particular, in our approach
the quantum complex Hilbert space is just a projection of contextual
prequantum space – prespace(29,30) .
Another difference between our supplementarity and Bohr’s com-
plementarity is that we characterize supplementarity by studying in-
terferences of probabilities themselves. This gives the possibility to
introduce a simple quantitative measure of supplementarity as a coeffi-
cient of interference λ, which we call the coefficient of supplementarity.
cists complementarity is rigidly associated with mutual exclusivity, we believe we have no
other possibility than to introduce a new terminology.
Bohr’s principle of complementarity was not formulated in mathematical terms, but as
a general philosophic principle. There are various ways to understand (or perhaps mis-
understand) this principle. The crucial point is the interpretation of “mutual exlusivity”.
Here the difference between mathematical variables and physical properties, as well as their
relationship with observables, should be taken into account, see section 7. We emphasize
that the direct comparation of the Bohr’s principle of complementarity and our principle
of supplementarity is really impossible. For N. Bohr mutual exclusivity was related not
to objective properties of quantum systems, but to measurement contexts.
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The presence of this quantitative measure shifts discussion from the
purely philosophic framework to a physical and mathematical frame-
works.3
Our model is fundamentally contextual, and supplementarity is
consequently also contextual. The coefficient λ depends on a con-
text C under which observables are measured: λ = λC . It is therefore
meaningless to discuss supplementarity of observables a and b without
relation to the concrete complex of physical conditions C under which
these observables are measured. Observables can indeed be supple-
mentarity under one context and nonsupplementarity under another
one.
Since the Va¨xjo¨ model of reality is a statistical model, it depends
on the choice of a probability model. In this paper we use the fre-
quency probabilistic model (see R. von Mises(43), and also Ref. 44 on
this model and its applications in quantum physics). This model is
essentially more general than the conventional Kolmogorov model(45).
Note that other probabilistic models can be used, e.g., the Cox model
with conditional probabilities(46), see L. Ballentine(14) on application
of this model to Quantum Mechanics.
We remark that our principle of supplementarity is based on rather
extended probabilistic considerations developed in sections 3-5. A
reader not too keen on mathematical details is invited to go through
those probabilistic sections quickly and pay more attention to sections
6–8.
There are three appendixes, section 9 (Bell’s inequality) and sec-
tions 10, 11 on mathematical features of the contextual statistical
model (relations between Kolmogorovness, compatibility and com-
plementarity). The latter two sections are essentially mathematical.
They may be interesting for people working on mathematical problems
3It is noteworthy that our statistical measure of supplementarity λ is not based on the
Hilbert space formalism, see sections 3,4. Hence, one need not appeal from the very begin-
ning to the abstract characterization based on noncommutativity of operators representing
physical observables. It is only under special conditions that supplementary observables
can be represented by noncommutative operators in the complex Hilbert space, see Refs.
29, 30 for details. Note also that the coefficient of supplementarity λ can be calculated
directly on the basis of experimental statistical data. Since we start directly with statisti-
cal data, and since the conventional Hilbert space formalism is considered as a secondary
mathematical description, there is no necessity to relate our formalism with waves features
or superposition of individual states. This gives the possibility to apply our formalism (and
in particular the notion of supplementarity) outside the quantum domain, see, e.g., Refs.
40–42.
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of quantum probability and incompatibility.
2 Contextual statistical realistic model
From the very beginning it should be emphasized that the purpose
of this section is not to provide a new interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics. A general statistical model for observables based on the
contextual viewpoint to probability will merely be presented. It will
be shown that classical as well as quantum probabilistic models can
be obtained as a particular cases of our general contextual model, the
Va¨xjo¨ model. This model is not reduced to the conventional, classi-
cal and quantum models. In particular, it contains a new statistical
model: a model with hyperbolic cosh-interference (that induces ”hy-
perbolic quantum mechanics”).4
Realism is one of the main distinguishing features of the Va¨xjo¨
model since it is always possible manipulate objective properties, de-
spite the presence of such essentially quantum effects as, e.g., the
interference of probabilities.
As George W. Mackey pointed out in Ref. 10, probabilities can-
not be considered as abstract quantities defined outside any reference
to a concrete complex of physical conditions C. All probabilities are
conditional or better to say contextual.5 We remark that the same
point of view can be found in the works of A. N. Kolmogorov(45) and
R. von Mises(43). However, it seems that Mackey’s book was the first
thorough presentation of a program of conditional probabilistic de-
scription of measurements, both in classical and quantum physics. G.
Mackey did a lot to unify classical and quantum probabilistic descrip-
tion and, in particular, demystify quantum probability. One crucial
step is however missing in Mackey’s work. In his book(10), Mackey
introduced the quantum probabilistic model (based on the complex
Hilbert space) by means of a special axiom (Axiom 7, p. 71, in Ref.
10) that looked rather artificial in his general conditional probabilis-
tic framework. The impossibility to derive the quantum probabilistic
model from “natural axioms” (which are not based on such a quantum
4It should however be noted that hyperbolic model remains a purely mathematical
model, in contrast to those of classical physics and quantum mechanics, as it does not
relate to any known physics.
5The notion of conditional probability is typically used for events: P(A/B) is the
probability that the event A occurs under the condition that the event B has occurred.
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structure as the complex Hilbert space) is clearly the main disadvan-
tage of Mackey’s approach.
In our contextual probabilistic approach, structures specifically be-
longing to the realm of quantum mechanics (e.g., the interference of
probabilities, the complex probabilistic amplitudes, Bohr’s rule, or the
representation of some observables by noncommutative operators) are
derived on the basis of two natural axioms (that is, natural from the
point of view of classical probabilistic axiomatics).
Mackey’s model is based on a system of eight axioms, when our own
model requires only two axioms. Let us briefly mention the content
of Mackey first axioms. The first four axioms concern conditional
structure of probabilities, that is, they can be considered as axioms
of a classical probabilistic model. The fifth and sixth axioms are of
a logical nature (about questions). We reproduce below Mackey’s
“quantum axiom”, and Mackey’s own comments on this axiom (see
Ref. 10, pp. 71-72):
Axiom 7 (G. Mackey) The partially ordered set of all questions
in quantum mechanics is isomorphic to the partially ordered set of all
closed subsets of a separable, infinite dimensional Hilbert space.
“This axiom has rather a different character from Axioms 1 through
4. These all had some degree of physical naturalness and plausibility.
Axiom 7 seems entirely ad.hoc. Why do we make it? Can we jus-
tify making it? What else might we assume? We shall discuss these
questions in turn. The first is the easiest to answer. We make it be-
cause it “works”, that is, it leads to a theory which explains physical
phenomena and successfully predicts the results of experiments. It is
conceivable that a quite different assumption would do likewise but
this is a possibility that no one seems to have explored [But see recent
work of Jauch, Stueckelberg, and others at the University of Gene`ve
on real and quaternionic Hilbert spaces]. Ideally one would like to
have a list of physically plausible assumptions from which one could
deduce Axiom 7.”
Our activity can be considered as an attempt to find a list of phys-
ically plausible assumptions from which the Hilbert space structure
can be deduced. We show that this list can consist in two axioms (see
our Axioms 1 and 2) and that these axioms can be formulated in the
same classical probabilistic manner as Mackey’s Axioms 1–4.
Another important difference between the Va¨xjo¨ model and Mackey’s
model is that our model is not rigidly coupled to the measure the-
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oretic approach to probability. Many probabilistic models can be
used to mathematically define contextual probabilities. In this pa-
per we use the von Mises’ frequency approach to probability(43). This
approach is essentially more general than the Kolmogorov measure-
theoretic one. In general probabilistic data generated by a few col-
lectives, x, y, z, . . . , u, cannot be described by a single Kolmogorov
space. There are admittedly some mathematical difficulties in von
Mises’ approach, like the impossibility to rigorously define randomness
on a mathematical level. Nevertheless, in order to define probabilities
one need not necessarily to apply von Mises’ principle of randomness
(which is based on a rather confusing notion of place selection). The
frequency probability can be defined by the principle of statistical
stabilization of relative frequencies. It means that relative frequencies
νN =
n
N stabilize when N → ∞, i.e., |νN − νM | → 0, N,M → ∞.
Hence, the limit of νN exists and is called the frequency probabil-
ity. The frequency theory of probability, which is based only on the
principle of statistical stabilization is free of contradictions(44) .
Quantum formalism gives good predictions of frequency probabil-
ities, as was verified in an impressive number of experiments, but it
does not contain a description of randomness. In the light of the ap-
proach described above, the theory of quantum measurements appears
to be more about statistical stabilization of relative frequencies than
about randomness of data. It seems that in order to create a gen-
eral frequency probability theory, which would contain classical and
quantum probabilities as special cases, one could use the frequency
probabilistic model based only on the principle of statistical stabiliza-
tion.
2.1 Contextual statistical model of observa-
tions
A physical context C is a complex of physical conditions. Contexts
are fundamental elements of any contextual statistical model. Thus
construction of any model M should be started with fixing the col-
lection of contexts of this model; denote the collection of contexts by
the symbol C (so C is determined by M). In mathematical formalism
C is an abstract set (of “labels” of contexts). Another fundamental
element of any contextual statistical model M is a set of observables
O : any observable a ∈ O can be measured under a complex of physi-
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cal conditions C ∈ C. 6 For an a ∈ O, we denote the set of its possible
values (“spectrum”) by the symbol Xa.
We do not assume that all these observables can be measured si-
multaneously; so they need not be compatible. To simplify consider-
ations, we shall consider only discrete observables and, moreover, all
concrete investigations will be performed for dichotomous observables.
Axiom 1: For any observable a ∈ O, there are defined contexts
Cα corresponding to α-filtrations: if we perform a measurement of a
under the complex of physical conditions Cα, then we obtain the value
a = α with probability 1. It is supposed that the set of contexts C
contains filtration-contexts Cα for all observables a ∈ O.
Axiom 2: There are defined contextual probabilities P(a = α/C)
for any context C ∈ C and any observable a ∈ O .
Probabilities P(b = β/C) are interpreted as contextual probabili-
ties. Especially important role will be played by probabilities:
pb/a(β/α) ≡ P(b = β/Cα), a, b ∈ O, α ∈ Xa, β ∈ Xb,
where Cα is the [a = α]-filtration context.
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At the moment we do not fix a definition of probability. Depending
on a choice of probability theory we can obtain different models. For
any C ∈ C, there is defined the set of probabilities:
E(O, C) = {P(a = α/C) : a ∈ O}
6We shall denote observables by Latin letters, a, b, ..., and their values by Greek letters,
α, β, ...
7We prefer to call probabilities with respect to a context C ∈ C contextual probabilities.
Of course, it would be also possible to call them conditional, but the latter term was
already used in other approaches (e.g., Bayes-Kolmogorov). In the opposition of the Bayes-
Kolmogorov model, the contextual probability is not probability that an event, say B,
occurs under the condition that another event, say C, has been occurred. The contextual
probability P(b = β/C) is probability to get the result b = β under the complex of physical
conditions C. We can say that this is the probability that the event Bβ = {b = β} occurs
under the complex of physical conditions C. Thus in our approach not event, but context
should be considered as a condition; see also Accardi(15), Ballentine(14) and De Muynck(17).
In particular, the contextual probability pb/a(β/α) ≡ P(b = β/Cα), is not probability that
the event Bβ = {b = β} occurs under the condition that the event Aα = {a = α} has
been occurred. To find probability pb/a(β/α), it is not sufficient to observe the event
Bβ following the event Aα. It should be first verified that there is really the complex of
physical conditions Cα. Then there are performed measurements of the observable b under
this context, see also Ballentine(14) and De Muynck(17).
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We complete this probabilistic data by Cα-contextual probabilities:
D(O, C) = {P(a = α/C),P(b = β/C), ...,P(a = α/Cβ),P(b =
β/Cα), ... : a, b, ... ∈ O}.
We remark that D(O, C) does not contain the simultaneous prob-
ability distribution of observables O. Data D(O, C) gives a proba-
bilistic image of the context C through the system of observables O.
We denote by the symbol D(O, C) the collection of probabilistic data
D(O, C) for all contexts C ∈ C. There is defined the map:
π : C → D(O, C), π(C) = D(O, C). (1)
In general this map is not one-to-one. Thus the π-image of contextual
reality is very rough: not all contexts can be distinguished with the aid
of probabilistic data produced by the class of observables O.
Definition 2.1. A contextual statistical model of reality is a triple
M = (C,O,D(O, C)) (2)
where C is a set of contexts and O is a set of observables which sat-
isfy to axioms 1,2, and D(O, C) is probabilistic data about contexts C
obtained with the aid of observables O.
We call observables belonging the set O ≡ O(M) reference of ob-
servables. Inside of a model M observables belonging O give the only
possible references about a context C ∈ C. Our general model can
(but, in principle, need not) be completed by some interpretation of
reference observables a ∈ O. By the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation reference
observables are interpreted as properties of contexts.
Realistic interpretation of observables: “If an observation of
a under a complex of physical conditions C ∈ C gives the result a = α,
then this value is interpreted as the objective property of the context
C (at the moment of the observation).”
Remark 2.2. (Number of reference observables) In both most
important physical models – in classical and quantum models – the set
O of reference observables consists of two observables: position and
momentum (or energy). I think that this number “two” of reference
observables plays the crucial role (at least in the quantum model).
2.2 Frequency description of probability dis-
tributions
By taking into account Remark 2.2, we consider a set of reference
observables O = {a, b} consisting of two observables a and b. We
12
denotes the sets of values (“spectra”) of the reference observables by
symbols Xa and Xb, respectively.
Let C be some context. In a series of observations of b (which can
be infinite in a mathematical model) we obtain a sequence of values
of b :
x ≡ x(b/C) = (x1, x2, ..., xN , ...), xj ∈ Xb. (3)
In a series of observations of a we obtain a sequence of values of a :
y ≡ y(a/C) = (y1, y2, ..., yN , ...), yj ∈ Xa. (4)
We suppose that the principle of the statistical stabilization for relative
frequencies(43,44) holds true. This means that the frequency probabil-
ities are well defined:
pb(β) ≡ Px(b = β) = lim
N→∞
νN (β;x), β ∈ Xb; (5)
pa(α) ≡ Py(a = α) = lim
N→∞
νN (α; y), α ∈ Xa. (6)
Here νN (β;x) and νN (α; y) are frequencies of observations of values
b = β and a = α, respectively (under the complex of conditions C).
As was remarked, R. von Mises considered in his theory two prin-
ciples: a) the principle of the statistical stabilization for relative fre-
quencies; b)the principle of randomness. A sequence of observations
for which both principle hold was called a collective. An analog of von
Mises’ theory for sequences of observations which satisfy the principle
of statistical stabilization (so relative frequencies converge to limit-
probabilities, but these limits need not be invariant with respect to
von Mises place selections) was developed in Ref. 44; we call such
sequences S-sequences. Everywhere in this paper it will be assumed
that sequences of observations are S-sequences, cf. Ref. 44.
Let Cα, α ∈ Xa, be contexts corresponding to α-filtrations, see
Axiom 1. By observation of b under the context Cα we obtain a
sequence:
xα ≡ x(b/Cα) = (x1, x2, ..., xN , ...), xj ∈ Xb. (7)
It is also assumed that for sequences of observations xα, α ∈ Xa, the
principle of statistical stabilization for relative frequencies holds true
and the frequency probabilities are well defined:
pb/a(β/α) ≡ Pxα(b = β) = lim
N→∞
νN (β;x
α), β ∈ Xb. (8)
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Here νN (β;x
α), α ∈ Xa, are frequencies of observations of value b = β
under the complex of conditions Cα. We obtain probability distribu-
tions:
Px(β), Py(α), Pxα(β), α ∈ Xa, β ∈ Xb. (9)
We can repeat all previous considerations by changing b/a-conditioning
to a/b-conditioning. We consider contexts Cβ, β ∈ Xb, corresponding
to selections with respect to values of the observable b and the cor-
responding collectives yβ ≡ y(a/Cβ) induced by observations of a in
contexts Cβ. There can be defined probabilities p
a/b(α/β) ≡ Pyβ (α).
Combining these data with data (9) we obtain
D(O, C) = {pa(α), pb(β), pb/a(β/α), pa/b(α/β) : α ∈ Xa, β ∈ Xb}
2.3 Systems, ensemble representation
We now complete the contextual statistical model by considering sys-
tems ω (e.g., physical or cognitive, or social,..), (Cf. Ballentine(14)). In
our approach systems as well as contexts are considered as elements of
realty. In our model a context C ∈ C is represented by an ensemble
SC of systems which have been interacted with C. For such systems we
shall use notation: ω ←֓ C The set of all (e.g., physical or cognitive,
or social) systems which are used to represent all contexts C ∈ C is
denoted by the symbol Ω ≡ Ω(C). Thus we have a map:
C → SC = {ω ∈ Ω : ω ←֓ C}. (10)
This is the ensemble representation of contexts. We set
S ≡ S(C) = {S : S = SC , C ∈ C}.
This is the collection of all ensembles representing contexts belonging
to C. The ensemble representation of contexts is given by the map (10)
I : C → S
Reference observables O are now interpreted as observables on systems
ω ∈ Ω. In our approach it is not forbidden to interpret the values of the
reference observables as objective properties of systems. These objec-
tive properties coexist in nature and they can be related to individual
systems ω ∈ Ω. However, the probabilistic description is possible only
with respect to a fixed context C. Noncontextual probabilities have no
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meaning. So values a(ω) and b(ω) coexist for a single system ω ∈ Ω,
but noncontextual (“absolute”) probabilities P(ω ∈ Ω : a(ω) = y), ...
are not defined. 8
Definition 2.2. The ensemble representation of a contextual sta-
tistical model M = (C,O,D(O, C)) is a triple
S(M) = (S,O,D(O, C)) (11)
where S is a set of ensembles representing contexts C, O is a set
of observables, and D(O, C) is probabilistic data about ensembles S
obtained with the aid of observables O.
3 Formula of total probability and mea-
sures of supplementarity
Let M = (C,O,D(O, C)) be a model in which O = {a, b} and a, b
are dichotomous observables. Let C ∈ C. In general there are no rea-
sons to assume that all probability distributions in D(a, b, C) should
be described by a single Kolmogorov probability space (absolute Kol-
mogorov space) P = (Ω,F ,P). Thus the classical (Kolmogorovian)
formula of total probability:
P(b = β) =
∑
α
P(a = α)P(b = β/a = α). (12)
can be violated. We do not have such a formula in the contextual fre-
quency approach, where the conditional probabilities P(b = β/a = α)
are defined as contextual probabilities P(b = β/Cα).
9 In this approach
everything is absolutely clear from the very beginning: there are 6 dif-
ferent S-sequences (or collectives), see section 2.2:
x = x(b/C), y = y(a/C), xα = x(b/Cα), y
β = y(a/Cβ),
8Thus, instead of mutual exclusivity of observables (cf. Bohr’s principle of comple-
mentarity), we consider contextuality of probabilities and “supplementarity” of the refer-
ence observables (in the sense that they give supplementary statistical information about
contexts). Oppositely to the very common opinion, such models (with realistic observ-
ables) can have nontrivial quantum-like representations (in complex and hyperbolic Hilbert
spaces) which are based on the formula of total probability with interference terms.
9We recall that this is the premeasurement conditioning. The complex of physical
conditions Cα, corresponding to [a = α]-selection, is fixed before the b-measurement.
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where α = α1, α2, β = β1, β2. In the opposition to the Kolmogorov
approach, in the contextual frequency approach we have no chance
to speculate about a single probability. In the contextual frequency
approach in general we have:
δ(β/a,C) = Px(β)−
∑
α
Py(α)Pxα(β) 6= 0 (13)
On the other hand, as was mentioned, in the Kolmogorov model we
have:
δ(β/a,C) = 0. (14)
Hence, in the Kolmogorov model by using the Bayesian sum of the
conditional probabilities P(b = β/a = α) we find nothing new, but
the unconditional probability for b = β :
P(b = β) =
∑
α
P(a = α)P(b = β/a = α).
Therefore in these models by obtaining the value b = β in a series
of observations under the condition a = α we do not obtain new
probabilistic information. However, in the contextual approach we
obtain new information via conditional observations, see (13). Hence
conditional observations give us supplementary information which is
not contained in statistical data for unconditional observations.
Definition 3.1. The quantity δ(β/a,C) is said to be a probabilistic
measure of b/a-supplementarity in the context C.
We can rerwite the equality (13) in the form which is similar to
the classical formula of total probability:
Px(β) =
∑
α
Py(α)Pxα(β) + δ(β/a,C), (15)
or by using shorter notations:
pb(β) =
∑
α
pa(α)pb/a(β/α) + δ(β/a,C). (16)
This formula has the same structure as the quantum formula of total
probability:
[classical part] + additional term.
To write the additional term in the same form as in the quantum
representation of statistical data, we perform the normalization of the
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probabilistic measure of supplementarity by the square root of the
product of all probabilities:
λ(β/a,C) =
δ(β/a,C)
2
√∏
α p
a(α)pb/a(β/α)
. (17)
The coefficient λ(β/a,C) also will be called the probabilistic mea-
sure of supplementarity.
Of course, it would be better to call λ the coefficient of comple-
mentarity, but the latter terminology was already reserved by N. Bohr.
By using this coefficient we rewrite (16) in the quantum-like form:
pb(β) =
∑
α
pa(α)pb/a(β/α) + 2λ(β/a,C)
√∏
α
pa(α)pb/a(β/α). (18)
The coefficient λ(β/a,C) is well defined only in the case when all
probabilities pa(α), pb/a(β/α) are strictly positive. We consider the
matrix
Pb/a = (pb/a(β/α))
Traditionally this matrix is called the matrix of transition probabili-
ties. In our approach pb/a(β/α) ≡ Pxα(b = β) is the probability to
obtain the value b = β for the S-sequence (collective) xα. Thus in gen-
eral we need not speak about states of physical systems and interpret
pb/a(β/α) as the probability of the transition from the state α to the
state β. We remark that the matrix Pb/a is always stochastic:∑
β
pb/a(β/α) = 1 (19)
for any α ∈ Xa, because for any S-sequence (or collective) xα :∑
β
Pxα(b = β) = 1.
We defined a nondegenerate S-sequence (or collective) y as such
that
pa(α) ≡ Py(α) 6= 0 for all α.
A context C is said to be a-nondegenerate (b-nondegenerate) if the
corresponding S-sequence (or collective) y ≡ y(a/C) (x ≡ x(b/C))
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is nondegenerate. We remark that the contexts Cα (S-sequences or
collectives) xα) are b-nondegenerate iff
pb/a(β/α) 6= 0. (20)
The representation (18) is the basis of transition to a (complex or
hyperbolic) Hilbert space representation of probabilistic dataD(a, b, C).
The representation (18) can be used only for nondegenerate contexts
C and Cα.
We can repeat all previous considerations by changing b/a-conditioning
to a/b-conditioning. We consider contexts Cβ corresponding to selec-
tions with respect to values of the observable b and the corresponding
S-sequences (or collectives) yβ ≡ y(a/Cβ). There can be defined prob-
abilistic measures of supplementarity δ(α/b,C) and λ(α/b,C), α ∈ Xa.
We remark that the contexts Cβ (S-sequences or collectives y
β) are
a-nondegenerate iff
pa/b(α/β) 6= 0. (21)
For nondegenerate contexts C and Cβ we have:
pa(α) =
∑
β
pb(β)pa/b(α/β) + 2λ(α/b,C)
√∏
β
pb(β)pa/b(α/β). (22)
Definition 3.2. Observables a and b are called (statistically) non-
degenerate if (20) and (21) hold.
Theorem 3.1. Let reference observables a and b be nondegenerate
and let a context C ∈ C be both a and b-nondegenerate. Then quantum-
like formulas of total probability (18) and (22) hold true.
In Ref. 1, 22 Theorem 3.1 was proved by using a long series of
calculations with relative frequencies; the proof presented in this paper
is really straightforward: supplementarity implies the violation of the
classical formula of total probability and the perturbation term can
be represented in the quantum-like form. As was shown in Refs. 1-3,
if |λ| ≤ 1, then we get cos-interference (see section ??); if |λ| > 1,
then we get cosh-interference.
4 Supplementary physical observables
Definition 4.1. Reference observables a and b are called b/a-supplementary
in a context C if
δ(β/a,C) 6= 0 for some β ∈ Xb. (23)
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Lemma 4.1. For any context C ∈ C, we have:∑
β∈Xb
δ(β/a,C) = 0 (24)
Proof. We have
1 =
∑
β∈Xb
pb(β) =
∑
β∈Xb
∑
α∈Xa
pa(α)pb/a(β/α) +
∑
β∈Xb
δ(β/a,C).
Since Pb/a is always a stochastic matrix, we have for any α ∈ Xa :∑
β∈Xb
pb/a(β/α) = 1.
By using that
∑
α∈Xa p
a(α) = 1 we obtain (24).
We pay attention to the fact that by Lemma 5.1 the coefficient
δ(β1/a,C) = 0 iff δ(β2/a,C) = 0. Thus b/a-supplementarity is equiv-
alent to the condition δ(β/a,C) 6= 0 both for β1 and β2.
Reference observables a and b are called supplementary in a context
C if they are b/a or a/b supplementary:
δ(β/a,C) 6= 0 or δ(α/b,C) 6= 0 for some β ∈ Xb, α ∈ Xa. (25)
By Lemma 4.1 observables are supplementary iff the coefficients
δ(β/a,C) = 0 and δ(α/b,C) = 0 for all β ∈ Xb, α ∈ Xa.
Let us consider a contextual model M with the set of contexts C.
Observables a and b are said to be supplementary in the model M if
there exists C ∈ C such that they are supplementary in the context C.
Reference observables a and b are said to be nonsupplementary in
the context C if they are neither b/a nor a/b-supplementary:
δ(β/a,C) = 0 and δ(α/b,C) = 0 for all β ∈ Xb, α ∈ Xa. (26)
Thus in the case of b/a-supplementarity we have (for β ∈ Xb) :
pb(β) 6=
∑
α
pa(α)pb/a(β/α); (27)
in the case of a/b-supplementarity we have (for α ∈ Xa):
pa(α) 6=
∑
β
pb(β)pa/b(α/β); (28)
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in the case of supplementarity we have (27) or (28). In the case of
nonsupplementarity we have both representations:
pb(β) =
∑
α
pa(α)pb/a(β/α), β ∈ Xb, (29)
pa(α) =
∑
β
pb(β)pa/b(α/β), α ∈ Xa. (30)
5 The principle of supplementarity
Our principle can be formulated in the following way: There exist
physical observables, say a and b, such that for some context C they
produce supplementary statistical information; in the sense that the
contextual probability distribution of, e.g., the observable, b could not
be reconstructed on the basis of the probability distribution of a. The
classical formula of total probability is violated; supplementarity of
the observables a and b under the context C induces interference of
probabilities pbC(x) and p
a
C(y).
6 The Hilbert space representation of
contexts based on conjugate observables
Definition 6.1 Observables a and b are said to be symmetrically con-
ditioned if
pa/b(α/β) = pb/a(β/α) (31)
Definition 6.2 Observables a and b are called (statistically) con-
jugate if they are symmetrically conditioned and nondegenerate:
pa/b(α/β) = pb/a(β/α) > 0
for all α, β.
We shall see that statistically conjugate observables a and b can be
represented by noncommutative operators aˆ and bˆ in the Hilbert space.
Everywhere below a and b will be (statistically) conjugate observables.
Suppose that, for every β ∈ Xb, the coefficient of supplementarity
|λ(b = β/a,C)| ≤ 1. In this case we can introduce new statistical
parameters θ(b = β/a,C) ∈ [0, 2π] and represent the coefficients of
statistical disturbance in the trigonometric form: λ(b = β/a,C) =
cos θ(b = β/a,C). Parameters θ(b = β/a,C) are called probabilistic
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phases. We remark that in general there is no geometry behind these
phases. By using the trigonometric representation of the coefficients
λ we obtain the well known formula of interference of probabilities
which is typically derived by using the Hilbert space formalism.
If both coefficients λ are larger than one, we can represent them
as λ(b = β/a,C) = ± cosh θ(b = β/a,C) and obtain the formula of
hyperbolic interference of probabilities; there can also be found models
with the mixed hyper-trigonometric behavior, see Refs. 29, 30.
We consider only the complex Hilbert space representation of trigono-
metric contexts:
C tr = {C : |λ(β/a,C)| ≤ 1, β ∈ Xb}.
Of course, the system C tr depends on the choice of a pair of refer-
ence observables, C tr ≡ C trb/a. We set paC(α) = P(a = α/C), pbC(β) =
P(b = β/C), p(β/α) = P(b = β/a = α), β ∈ Xb, α ∈ Xa. (In previous
sections we considered probabilities with respect to a fixed context C;
therefore this index was omitted). Let context C ∈ C tr. The interfer-
ence formula of total probability (18) can be written in the following
form:
pbc(β) =
∑
α∈Xa
paC(α)p(β/α) + 2 cos θC(β)
√
Πα∈Xap
a
C(α)p(β/α),
where θC(β) = θ(b = β/a,C) = ± arccos λ(b = β/a,C), β ∈ Xb. By
using the elementary formula: D = A + B + 2
√
AB cos θ = |√A +
eiθ
√
B|2, for A,B > 0, θ ∈ [0, 2π], we can represent the probability
pbC(β) as the square of the complex amplitude (Born’s rule):
pbC(β) = |ψC(β)|2, (32)
where a complex probability amplitude is defined by
ψ(β) ≡ ψC(β)
=
√
paC(α1)p(β/α1) + e
iθC(β)
√
paC(α2)p(β/α2) . (33)
We denote the space of functions: ψ : Xb → C by the symbol
Φ = Φ(Xb,C), where C is the field of complex numbers. Since Xb =
{β1, β2}, the Φ is the two dimensional complex linear space. By using
the representation (33) we construct the map Jb/a : C tr → Φ(Xb,C)
which maps contexts (complexes of, e.g., physical conditions) into
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complex amplitudes. The representation (32) of probability is noth-
ing other than the famous Born rule. The complex amplitude ψC(β)
can be called a wave function of the complex of physical conditions
(context) C or a (pure) state. We set ebβ(·) = δ(β−·). The Born’s rule
for complex amplitudes (32) can be rewritten in the following form:
pbC(β) = |(ψC , ebβ)|2, (34)
where the scalar product in the space Φ(Xb,C) of complex amplitudes
is defined by the standard formula:
(ψ1, ψ2) =
∑
β∈Xb
ψ1(β)ψ¯2(β). (35)
The system of functions {ebβ}β∈Xb is an orthonormal basis in the
Hilbert space H = (Φ, (·, ·)) Let Xb ⊂ R, where R is the field of real
numbers. By using the Hilbert space representation of the Born’s rule
we obtain the Hilbert space representation of the classical conditional
expectation of the observable b:
E(b/C) =
∑
β∈Xb
β pbC(β) =
∑
β∈Xb
β |ϕC(β)|2
=
∑
β∈Xb
β (ψC , e
b
β)(ψC , e
b
β) = (bˆψC , ψC),
where the (self-adjoint) operator bˆ : H → H is determined by its
eigenvectors: bˆebβ = βe
b
β, β ∈ Xb. This is the multiplication operator
in the space of complex functions Φ(Xb,C) : bˆψ(β) = βψ(β). It is
natural to represent this observable (in the Hilbert space model) by
the operator bˆ. We would like to have Born’s rule not only for the
b-observable, but also for the a-observable:
paC(α) = |(ψ, eaα)|2 , α ∈ Xa.
How can we define the basis {eaα} corresponding to the a-observable?
Such a basis can be found starting with interference of probabilities.
We set uaj =
√
paC(αj), pij = p(βj/αi), uij =
√
pij , θj = θC(βj). We
have:
ψ = ua1e
a
1 + u
a
2e
a
2, (36)
where
ea1 = (u11, u12), e
a
2 = (e
iθ1u21, e
iθ2u22) (37)
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We consider the matrix of transition probabilities Pb/a = (pij). It is
always a stochastic matrix: pi1 + pi2 = 1, i = 1, 2). We remind that
a matrix is called double stochastic if it is stochastic and, moreover,
p1j +p2j = 1, j = 1, 2. The system {eai } is an orthonormal basis iff the
matrix Pb/a is double stochastic and probabilistic phases satisfy the
constraint: θ2 − θ1 = π mod 2π, see Refs. 29, 30
.
Thus if the matrix Pb/a is double stochastic, then the a-observable
is represented by the operator aˆ which is diagonal (with eigenvalues α)
in the basis {eaα}. The classical conditional average of the observable
a coincides with the quantum Hilbert space average:
E(a/C) =
∑
α∈α
αpaC(α) = (aˆφC , φC), C ∈ C tr.
7 Complementarity, supplementarity and
mutual exclusivity
I start this section with an extended citation from the report of one
of the referees. The problems discussed by those referee are of great
importance for clarifying the role of the mutual exclusivity in Bohr’s
principle of complementarity:
“I would like now to comment on the author’s ”supplementarity
principle”. The author juxtaposes this principle to Bohr’s complemen-
tarity principle, specifically on the account of the mutual exclusivity
of whatever elements are involved in a given complementary situation.
(I shall explain the term ”elements” and my emphasis presently.) Ac-
cording to Bohr’s interpretation, quantum mechanics is characterized
by complementary physical situations, say, those of the position and
momentum measurements for a given quantum object. Bohr’s termi-
nology refers to situations that are mutually exclusive and hence not
applicable at the same time, and yet both defined as possible in order
to achieve a comprehensive (complete) physical description. This mu-
tual exclusivity is no longer required by the author’s supplementarity
principle, and it is replaced by the rule for conditioned probabilities
for the corresponding observables, such as position and momentum.
It appears to me that there is some misunderstanding or confu-
sion here as concerns Bohr’s complementarity principle, which is not
uncommon in treatments of Bohr. Indeed, in the present case it may
be a matter of further clarification or, again, a greater lucidity of
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exposition than misunderstanding. I should add that one’s under-
standing of Bohr’s complementarity principle may depend on which
Bohr one reads; in particular there are differences between his earlier
and his later (e.g., post-EPR) views concerning complementarity. To
some degree, the nature of the ”elements” involved in complementary
situations change in Bohr’s later view of the quantum-mechanical sit-
uation (hence my emphasis above). In Bohr’s later view, to which the
author refers, the situation may be seen as follows.
Such variables as position and momentum not only cannot be mea-
sured but also cannot be assigned or indeed defined simultaneously,
as the author suggests. It is important, however, that this argumen-
tation applies strictly to a given physical situation of measurement,
whereby such variables as position or momentum (understood in terms
of classical physics) and the corresponding measurable physical prop-
erties now refer only to measuring instruments impacted by quantum
objects.
The author seems to me to be insufficiently attentive to these nu-
ances, especially those concerning the differences between mathemat-
ical variables and physical properties, and between each of these and
observables. Part of the problem is the ambiguity of the term ”ob-
servable” in quantum mechanics. It can refer to both an observable
property and a corresponding variable, say, as an operator in a Hilbert
space. The relationships between both, essentially different, types of
”observables”, Hilbert-space operators and measurable quantities, and
specifically the assignment of probabilities to the outcomes of mea-
surements that result, may be seen as defining the essence of quantum
mechanics.
In Bohr, an assignment and the definition of certain physical prop-
erties (which, again, pertain to the measuring instruments involved
and are seen as classical physical variables) would always be mutually
exclusive, and the assignment of probabilities would be affected ac-
cordingly. The definition of mathematical variables as Hilbert-space
operators is, however, a more complex matter. Both variables poten-
tially involved in one or the other complementary situation of mea-
surement possible at any given point may be viewed as being, at that
point, definable simultaneously (rather than being mutually exclusive)
as formal mathematical entities. The reason for that is that we con-
sider formally the same Hilbert space in any given situation of mea-
surement, where we would, for example, consider the commutators
corresponding to the uncertainty relations for such variables.”
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I agree with the referee that in this paper there is investigated
”mathematical mutual exclusivity” and the physical consequences of
our principle of supplementarity should be investigated in more detail.
We shall do this in section 8 by replying to the questions of another
referee of the paper.
Now we discuss mainly mathematical framework. I agree with the
referee that one should distinguish between mathematical variables,
physical properties and observables. The essence of quantum mechan-
ics (as physical theory) is in understanding relationships between these
mathematical and physical quantities. Denote mathematical variables
u and v, physical properties U and V and (physical) observables U
and V . Bohr’s mutual exclusivity is mutual exclusivity of U and V .
Thus by mutual exclusivity N. Bohr understood exclusivity of mea-
surement contexts DU and DV , cf., with the remark in introduction
on the difference between Bohr’s “measurement contextuality” and
our “preparation contextuality”. Physical observables U and V are
represented in quantum formalism by self-adjoint operators uˆ and vˆ.
As was rightly pointed out by the referee, uˆ and vˆ are definable si-
multaneously as formal mathematical quantities. The situation with
physical properties U and V is essentially more complicated. Logically
mutual exclusivity of observables U and V does not automatically im-
ply that physical properties U and V could not coexist. The views
of N. Bohr on this problem are not so clear. One could not say that
Bohr rejected the existence of physical properties. The result of a
measurement was considered by him as a property of the object, see
[] for the extended discussion. However, this result can be defined
only in the context of his measurement. Therefore for mutually ex-
clusive measurement contexts DU and DV it is forbidden to consider
the properties U and V as simultaneously coexisting. It should be
pointed out the simultaneous definability of mathematical variables uˆ
and vˆ (self-adjoint operators in the complex Hilbert space) does not
contradict to mutual exclusivity of the corresponding physical observ-
ables. The quantum formalism does not describe results of individual
measurements. Therefore operators uˆ and vˆ could not be assigned to
a single physical system ω.
Moreover, it seems that various “no-go” theorems, e.g., theorems of
von Neumann, Kochen-Specker, Bell, confirm Bohr’s views to comple-
mentarity. These theorems imply that it is even in principle impossible
to go deeper that quantum formalism. It is impossible to construct a
prequantum (‘classical”) probabilistic model containing mathematical
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variables u, v which could be assigned to individual systems.10
The Va¨xjo¨ model induces a totally different viewpoint to relation-
ships between mathematical variables, physical properties and observ-
ables. In the opposite to the common “quantum opinion” in this model
it is possible to define mathematical variables u = a and v = b which
are simultaneously defined for a single physical system ω : a(ω) and
b(ω) coexist. These functions represent physical observables U and
V which were denoted by the same symbols a and b. Here objective
properties U and V can coexist and they are represented by a(ω) b(ω).
As was pointed out, the conventional quantum formalism is a spe-
cial representation of the Va¨xjo¨ model in which one ignores the knowl-
edge about a(ω) and b(ω). Such an ignorance is convenient in the sit-
uation in that the simultaneous measurement of U = a and V = b is
impossible. Here impossibility need not be of fundamental nature, it
could be of purely technological nature, cf. section 8.
Quantum model can not describe a single-particle context Cω, but
the prequantum contextual model can contain such contexts.
As a consequence of this difference of models Bohr’s principle of
complementarity does not look so natural for the Va¨xjo¨ model and
should be changed to a new principle. We propose to consider sup-
plementarity with coexistence instead complementarity (with mutual
exclusivity).
8 Experimental consequences of the sup-
plementarity principle
One of the referees of this paper asked about possible experimen-
tal consequences of the supplementarity principle. He pointed out
that: “According to Bohr, observables a(ω), b(ω), when measured on
a system ω, may be considered as relevant information about ω only
when they are compatible, while in Khrennikov’s realistic contextual
model the contrary is claimed to be the case. In order to distinguish
10I do not know any Bohr’s comment on the possibility to justify his principle of com-
plementarity via “no-go” theorems, in particular, von Neumann theorem. It seems that N.
Bohr would not be so interested in such results. For him already Heisenberg’s uncertainty
relations and the impossibility to combine the position measurement with the interference
in the two slit experiment were sufficiently strong arguments in favor of complementarity
(in the sense of mutual exclusivity).
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both approaches, the author introduces the new notions of supple-
mentarity, and supplementary observables. Khrennikov’s claim may
be criticized, as Bohr’s complementarity standpoint and the associ-
ated incompatibility of some specific observables fits perfectly actual
laboratory practice. However, nobody knows how physics and present
day technical possibilities will evolve in the future and, therefore, the
possible theoretical alternative considered by Khrennikov may not be
excluded a priori.” Then the referee added that the physical relevance
and interest of the principle of supplementarity should be explained
somewhat more explicitly. “Relevant questions are e.g. how the prin-
ciple of supplementarity related to experiment, how may one profit
from additional information? Or is it at present only a theoretical
possibility, which may become interesting in the future?”
At the moment the principle of supplementarity has purely theoret-
ical value. It says that quantum probabilistic behavior need not imply
the impossibility to construct a realistic underlying model. Therefore
one cannot exclude the possibility to find (or create) a context C such
that Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations would be violated in this con-
text for some pair of conjugate variables a and b. Here Heisenberg’s
uncertainty relations are considered as an inequality for dispersions
of a and b for a statistical ensemble SC corresponding to the context
C, see e.g. L. Ballentine(14) . Thus there might be found a context C
such that dispersions of both a and b would be arbitrary small. Of
course, such a context C would be impossible to represent by a com-
plex probability amplitude ψC . Moreover, there could exist dispersion
free contexts. There is no contradiction with Neumann’s conclusion
on nonexistence of dispersion free contexts (because in our model such
contexts are not represented in the complex Hilbert space). In gen-
eral the set of trigonometric contexts Ctr (here |λ| ≤ 1, see section 2.9)
which can be represented in the complex Hilbert space is a proper sub-
set of the family of all possible contexts C of a contextual statistical
model M = (C,O,D(O, C)). We recall that there also exist hyperbolic
contexts, Chyp (here |λ| ≥ 1) which can be represented in so called
hyperbolic Hilbert space. It is possible to show that dispersion free
contexts belong to the class C \ (Ctr ∪ Chyp). 11
11It is easy to present mathematical models(1) in that C \(Ctr∪Chyp) 6= ∅ and there exist
dispersion free contexts. But the referee is completely right that until now such contexts
have not been found. There are two possibilities: either they do not exists in nature (as it
follows from the conventional viewpoint to QM) or there were never performed extended
experimental investigations in this direction. I hope that the development of quantum
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Another consequence of the principle of supplementarity which can
stimulate experimental research is that quantum-like probabilistic ef-
fects might be observed for systems and contexts (e.g. physical or
biological) for which existence of an underlying realistic model looks
very natural. Here an observation of interference of probabilities would
not be considered as a contradiction with the realistic model. As was
mentioned in Ref.1, such effects might be observed for ensembles of
macroscopic physical systems (related to specially designed contexts)
or for ensembles of cognitive systems, see the previous section.12
The referee also proposed to discuss in more detail relation be-
tween the present contextual statistical realist model and models with
hidden variables (HV). Surprisingly our model does not have close re-
lation with HV-models. Despite the realism of reference observables
(a(ω), b(ω) are well defined for any physical system ω), we do not as-
sume the existence of the simultaneous (frequency) probability distri-
bution (as people do in all HV-models), but the most important is that
even for each single variable probability distributions are contextual –
determined by complexes of experimental physical conditions. We did
not create a HV-model for QM. The only thing that was demonstrated
is that the interference of probabilities is compatible with the realistic
viewpoint to (reference) observables.
9 Appendix 1: Bell’s inequality
Typically Bell’s inequality is considered as a constraint for local re-
cryptography (which is fundamentally based on Bohr’s complementarity principle) could
clarify this problem.
12We remark that in cognitive science it is commonly believed that there can be created
a realistic neurophysiological model of brain functioning, see e.g. Ref. 47. It is natural
to suppose that such a realistic model would be of huge complexity. However, it is not so
easy to derive some conclusions about individual behavior of a system (brain) depending
on billions of (neuronal) parameters. Therefore in such a situation a probabilistic model
plays the important role. If we apply Bohr’s the complementarity principle, then it seems
that the quantum probabilistic model cannot be applied in this case (in the presence of
underlying realistic neurophysiological model). However, if we apply the contextual model,
then it is very natural to apply quantum-like model to describe the probabilistic behavior
of brain (as the whole), see Refs. 40–42. For example, R. Penrose(48) who evidently uses
Bohr’s principle of complementarity remarked: “It is hard to see how one could usefully
consider a quantum superposition of one neuron firing and not firing.” Therefore he was
not able to apply quantum formalism on the neurophysiological macroscale and, as a
consequence, he should go to the deepest level of matter described by quantum gravity.
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alistic models. The question of relation of Bell’s inequality with in-
terpretations of QM was discussed in details by L. Ballentine(14) , De
Muynck, De Baere and Marten(38), De Muynck(17). Our contextual
statistical realistic interpretation does not contradict to the experi-
mental fact of the violation of Bell’s inequality. In our model only two
reference observables are realistic and Bell’s theorem is about realism
of three observables. But it may be that is not the point! Bell’s re-
alism is a very special statistical realism, namely, the Kolmogorovian
realism. J. Bell claimed from the very beginning that there exist the
Kolmogorov probability measure ρ(dλ) on the space of hidden vari-
ables Λ (see, e.g., Accardi(15), see also Ref. 49, 50). But in general
there are no reasons for the existence of such a unique probability mea-
sure on Λ. For example, let us assume that Λ is the infinite dimensional
topological linear space (e.g., Hilbert or Banach). This assumption is
not so unnatural – it is clear that the space of hidden variables should
be of the greatest complexity(49). Moreovere, De Muynck, De Baere
and Marten(38) and De Muynck(17) proposed to consider quantum ob-
servables as averages with respect to trajectories, see also Ref. 49
(where that model was investigated). Such spaces are, of course, infi-
nite dimensional. It is well know that many natural distributions on
infinite dimensional spaces are not countably additive (for example,
some Gaussian measures, see Ref. 49 for analysis). Such distributions
are not probability measures; for them Bell’s calculations inducing the
Bell inequality cannot be performed. Recently it was shown that if,
instead of the Bell-Kolmogorov realism, one uses the frequency prob-
abilistic realism (von Mises realism), then in general there is no Bell’s
inequality(49) (neither GHZ-paradox) and, moreover, it is possible to
obtain the EPR-Bohm correlations. These correlations in the gen-
eral contextual probabilistic framework were obtained in Ref. 25. In
fact, the using of von Mises realism is closely related with objections to
Bell’s arguments presented by W. De Baere(51) (the hypothesis of non-
reproducibility) and K. Hess and W. Philipp(52) (taking into account
the time-structure of the experiment).
10 Appendix 2: Supplementarity and
Kolmogorovness
Definition 10.1. Probabilistic data D(a, b, C) is said to be Kol-
mogorovian if there exists a Kolmogorov probability space P = (Ω,F ,P)
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and random variables ξa and ξb on P such that:
pa(α) = P(ξa = α), p
b(β) = P(ξb = β); (38)
pb/a(β/α) = P(ξb = β/ξa = α), p
a/b(α/β) = P(ξa = α/ξb = β).
(39)
If data D(a, b, C) is Kolmogorovian then the observables a and b
can represented by Kolmogorovian random variables ξa and ξb.
Lemma 10.1. Data D(a, b, C) is Kolmogorovian if and only if
pa(α)pb/a(β/α) = pb(β)pa/b(α/β) (40)
Proof. a) If data D(a, b, C) is Kolmogorovian then (40) is reduced
to the equality P(O1 ∩O2) = P(O2 ∩O1) for O1, O2 ∈ F .
b) Let (40) holds true. We set Ω = Xa ×Xb,Xa = {α1, α2},Xb =
{β1, β2}. We define the probability distribution on Ω by
P(α, β) = pb(β)pa/b(α/β) = pa(α)pb/a(β/α);
and define the random variables ξa(ω) = α, ξb(ω) = β for a system
ω on which the outcomes α, β are found when observables a, b are
measured. We have
P(ξa(ω) = α) =
∑
β P(α, β) =
∑
β p
a(α)pb/a(β/α)
= pa(α)
∑
β p
b/a(β/α) = pa(α).
And in the same way P(b = β) = pb(β). Thus
P(a = α/b = β) =
P(a = α, b = β)
P(b = β)
=
pb(β)pa/b(α/β)
pb(β)
= pa/b(α/β).
And in the same way we prove that pb/a(β/α) = P(b = β/a = α).
We now investigate the relation between Kolmogorovness and non-
supplementarity. If D(a, b, C) is Kolmogorovian then the formula of
total probability holds true and we have (26). Thus observables a and
b are nonsupplementary (in the context C). Thus:
Komogorovness implies nonsupplementarity
or as we also can say:
Supplementarity implies non-Kolmogorovness.
However, in the general case nonsupplementarity does not imply
that probabilistic data D(a, b, C) is Kolmogorovian. Let us investigate
in more detail the case when both matrices Pa/b and Pb/a are double
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stochastic. We recall that a matrix Pb/a = (pb/a(β/α)) is double
stochastic if it is stochastic (so (19) holds true) and, moreover,∑
α
pb/a(β/α) = 1, β = β1, β2. (41)
Remark 10.1. (Double stochasticity as the law of statistical bal-
ance) As was mentioned, the equality(19) holds true automatically.
This is a consequence of additivity and normalization by 1 of the
probability distribution of any collective xα. But the equality (41)
is an additional condition on the observables a and b. Thus by con-
sidering double stochastic matrices we choose a very special pair of
reference observables. In Ref. 2 I tried to find the physical meaning
of the equality (19). Since pb/a(β/α2) = 1 − pb/a(β/α1), the Cα1 and
Cα2 contexts compensate each other in “preparation of the property”
b = β. Thus the equation (41) could be interpreted the law of statis-
tical balance for the property b = β. If both matrices Pb/a and Pa/b
are double stochastic then we have laws of statistical balance for both
properties: a = α and b = β.
Definition 10.2. Observables a and b are said to be statistically
balanced if both matrices Pb/a and Pa/b are double stochastic.
It is useful to recall the following well known result about double
stochasticity for Kolmogorovian random variables:
Lemma 10.2. Let ξa and ξb be random variables on a Kolmogorov
space P = (Ω,F ,P). Then the following conditions are equivalent
1). The matrices Pa/b = (P(ξa = α/ξb = β)), P
b/a = (P(ξb =
β/ξa = α)) are double stochastic.
2). Random variables are uniformly distributed:
P(ξa = α) = P(ξb = β) =
1
2 .
3). Random variables are symmetrically conditioned:
P(ξa = α/ξb = β) = P(ξb = β/ξa = α). (42)
This result is not true in the contextual frequency approach and
this fact is used in the following proposition:
Proposition 10.1. A Kolmogorov model for data D(a, b, C) need
not exist even in the case of nonsupplementary statistically balanced
observables having the uniform probability distribution.
Proof. Let us consider probabilistic data D(a, b, C) such that
pa(α) = pb(β) = 1/2 and both matrices Pa/b and Pb/a are double
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stochastic. But let pa/b(α/β) 6= pb/a(β/α). Then by Lemma 10.1 data
D(a, b, C) is non-Kolmogorovian, but
2δ(α/β,C) = 1−
∑
β
pa/b(α/β) = 0, 2δ(β/α,C) = 1−
∑
α
pb/a(β/α) = 0.
It seems to be that symmetrical conditioning plays the cruicial role
in these considerations.
Lemma 10.3. If observables a and b are symmetrically condi-
tioned, then they are statistically balanced (so the matrices Pa/b and
Pb/a are double stochastic).
Proof. We have∑
β
pa/b(α/β) =
∑
β
pb/a(β/α) =
∑
β
Pxα(b = β) = 1;
∑
α
pb/a(β/α) =
∑
α
Pyβ (a = α) = 1.
As we have seen in Proposition 10.1, statistically balanced observ-
ables need not be symmetrically conditioned.
Proposition 10.2. Let observables a and b be symmetrically
conditioned. Probabilistic data D(a, b, C) is Kolmogorovian iff the ob-
servables a and b are nonsupplementary in the context C.
Proof. Suppose that a and b are nonsupplementary. We set
pb/a(1/1) = pb/a(2/2) = p and pb/a(1/2) = pb/a(2/1) = 1− p
(we recall that by Lemma 10.3 the matrix Pb/a is double stochastic).
By (29), (30) we have
pa(αi) =
∑
β
pb(β)pa/b(αi/β) =
∑
β
∑
α
pa(α)pb/a(β/α)pa/b(αi/β)
=
∑
α
pa(α)
∑
β
pb/a(β/α)pb/a(β/αi).
Let us consider the case i = 1 :
pa(α1) = p
a(α1)(p
2+(1−p)2)+2pa(α2)p(1−p) = pa(α1)(1−4p+
4p2) + 2p(1− p).
Thus pa(α1) = 1/2. Hence p
a(α2) = 1/2. In the same way we get
that pb(β1) = p
b(β2) = 1/2. Thus the condition (40) holds true and
there exist a Kolmogorov model P = (Ω,F ,P) for probabilistic data
D(a, b, C).
Conclusion. In the case of symmetrical conditioning Kolmogorov-
ness is equivalent to nonsupplementarity.
32
11 Appendix 3: Incompatibility, sup-
plementarity and existence of the joint
probability distribution
The notions of incompatible and complementary variables are consid-
ered as synonymous in the Copenhagen quantum mechanics. More-
over, compatibility (and consequently noncomplementarity) is consid-
ered as equivalent to existence of the simultaneous probability distri-
bution
P(α, β) = P(a = α, b = β).
We now consider similar questions for our Va¨xjo¨ model.
11.1. Existence of the simultaneous probability distribu-
tion. By analogy with Definition 5.1 we may propose the following
definition:
Definition 11. 1. Probabilistic data
W (a, b, C) = {pa(α), pb(β)},
where C is a context, is said to be Kolmogorovian if there exists a
Kolmogorov probability space P = (Ω,F ,P) and random variables ξa
and ξb on P such that:
pa(α) = P(ξa = α), p
b(β) = P(ξb = β). (43)
However, it is evident that data W (a, b, C) is always Kolmogoro-
vian. For example, we can always define the Kolmogorov measure
P(α, β) = pa(α)pb(β). (44)
It is evident that the marginal distributions of this probability coincide
with pa(α) and pb(β). Of course, such a probability is not uniquely de-
fined and in general this is a purely mathematical construction which
has no physical meaning. In particular, the probability (44) always
corresponds to independent random variables ξa and ξb. However, in
general observables a and b are not independent. Therefore the prob-
lem of Kolmogorovness of dataW (a, b, C) can be investigated in phys-
ical framework only by using the frequency probability theory.
We emphasize that mathematical Kolmogorovness of dataW (a, b, C)
does not imply Kolmogorovness of data D(a, b, C). If data W (a, b, C)
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is Kolmogorovian, then there are well defined Bayes-Kolmogorov con-
ditional probabilities:
P(Aα/Bβ) =
P(Aα ∩Bβ)
P(Bβ)
,
where Aα = {ω ∈ Ω : a(ω) = α}, Bβ = {ω ∈ Ω : b(ω) = β}. However,
in general these measure-theoretical conditional probabilities do not
coincide with experimental conditional probabilities determined in the
frequency framework13:
pa/b(α/β) = Pyβ (α).
In particular, Kolmogorovness of data W (a, b, C) does not imply that
probabilistic measures of supplementarity δ(α/β,C) and δ(β/α,C)
are equal to zero.
Conclusion. Kolmogorovness of data W (a, b, C) does not imply
nonsupplementarity of observables a and b in the context C.
11.2. Incompatible and supplementary observables. As
usual, observables a and b are called compatible in a context C if it is
possible to perform a simultaneous observation of them under C. For
any instant of time t, there can be observed a pair of values z(t) =
(a(t), b(t)). There is well defined a sequence of results of observations:
z(a, b/C) = (z1, z2, ..., zN , ...), zj = (yj , xj),
where yj = α1 or α2 and xj = β1 or β2. Observables a and b are in-
compatible in a context C if it is impossible to perform a simultaneous
observation of them under C.
Observables a and b are said to be statistically compatible in a con-
text C if they are compatible in C and the z(a, b/C) is an S-sequence
(or collective). 14 Thus there exists the frequency simultaneous prob-
ability distribution:
P(α, β) ≡ Pz(α, β) = lim
N→∞
nN (α, β; z)
N
. (45)
We remark that in general existence of this frequency probability dis-
tribution (45) has nothing to do with existence of a formal Kolmogorov
13But even in the Kolmogorov framework we cannot define conditional probabilities in
the unique way, because a Kolmogorov measure for dataW (a, b, C) is not uniquely defined.
14In the opposite case observables are statistically incompatible.
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probability distribution – Kolmogorovness of data W (a, b, C). As was
mentioned, data W (a, b, C) is always Kolmogorovian, but sequences
of results of observations y and x are not always combinable.
If a and b are statistically compatible in a context C then data
D(a, b, C) is Kolmogorovian, because pa/b(α/β) = Pz(a = α/b = β)
and pb/a(β/α) = Pz(b = β/a = α).
Thus we have:
Statistical compatibility implies Kolmogorovness of data D(a, b, C)
or
Non-Kolmogorovness of data D(a, b, C) implies statistical incom-
patibility
Thus
Statistical compatibility implies nonsupplementarity
or
Supplementarity implies statistical incompatibility
However, since in general nonsupplementarity does not imply Kol-
mogorovness of data D(a, b, C), see Proposition 5.1, we have:
Nonsupplementarity does not imply statistical compatibility
Thus there can exist a context C such that observables a and b
do not produce supplementary information15, but they do not have
the frequency joint probability distribution. The notions of statistical
compatibility and nonsupplementarity are not equivalent. Hence, the
notions of supplementarity and incompatibility are neither equivalent:
Statistical incompatibility does not imply supplementarity
Thus there can exist a context C such that observables a and b do
not have the frequency joint probability distribution, but at the same
time they do not produce supplementary information.
Let us consider a contextual statistical model M = (C,O,D(O, C).
If physical observables a and b are (statistically) compatible for any
C ∈ C then they are called (statistically) compatible in the model M.
They are called (statistically) incompatible in the model M if there
exists C ∈ C such that they are (statistically) incompatible for C.
11.3. Compatibility does not imply statistical compati-
bility. In quantum physics compatibility of observables – the pos-
sibility to perform a simultaneous observation– is typically identified
15Hence all coefficients δ(α/b, C), δ(β/a, C) are equal to zero.
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with statistical compatibility – existence of the frequency simultane-
ous probability distribution (45). This is a natural consequence of
the Kolmogorovian psychology. In the frequency probability theory
we should distinguish compatibility and statistical compatibility. We
present an example in which observables are compatible, but the limit
(45) does not exist, so observables are not statistically compatible.
Of course, this means that y = y(a/C) and x = x(b/C) are not
combinable. We need some well known results about the generalized
probability given by the density of natural numbers, see Ref. 18 (we
recall that A. N. Kolmogorov considered the density of natural num-
bers as an example of probability, but it was before he proposed the
conventional axiomatics). For a subset A ⊂ N the quantity
P(A) = lim
N→∞
|A ∩ {1, ..., N}|
N
,
is called the density of A if the limit exists. Here the symbol |V | is
used to denote the number of elements in a finite set V.
Let G denote the collection of all subsets ofN which admit density.
It is evident that each finite A ⊂ N belongs to G and P(A) = 0. It is
also evident that each subset B = N \A, where A is finite, belongs to
G and P(B) = 1 (in particular, P(N) = 1). The reader can easily find
examples of sets A ∈ G such that 0 < P(A) < 1. The “generalized
probability” P has the following properties (cf. S. Gudder(11)):
Proposition 11.1. Let A1, A2 ∈ G and A1 ∩ A2 = ∅. Then A1 ∪
A2 ∈ G and
P(A1 ∪A2) = P(A1) +P(A2).
Proposition 11.2. Let A1, A2 ∈ G. The following conditions are
equivalent:
1)A1 ∪A2 ∈ G; 2)A1 ∩A2 ∈ G;
3)A1 \A2 ∈ G; 4)A2 \ A1 ∈ G.
There are standard formulas:
P(A1 ∪A2) = P(A1) +P(A2)−P(A1 ∩A2);
P(A1 \A2) = P(A1)−P(A1 ∩A2).
It is possible to find sets A,B ∈ G such that, for example, A∩B 6∈
G. Let A be the set of even numbers. Take any subset C ⊂ A which
has no density. In fact, you can find C such that
1
N
|C ∩ {1, 2, · · · , N}|
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is oscillating. There happen two cases: C ∩ {2n} = {2n} or = ∅. Set
B = C ∪ {2n− 1 : C ∩ {2n} = ∅}
Then, both A and B have densities one half. But A ∩ B = C has no
density. Thus G is not a set algebra.
We now consider a context C which produces natural numbers.
We introduce two dichotomous observables:
a(n) = IA(n), b(n) = IB(n),
where IO(x) is the characteristic function of a set O. We assume that
these observables are compatible: we can, e.g., look at a number n
and find both values a(n) and b(n).16 We obtain two S-sequences:
y = y(a/C) = (y1, ..., yN , ...), x = x(b/C) = (x1, ..., xN , ...), yj , xj = 0, 1.
The frequency probability distributions are well defined:
pa(α) ≡ Py(α) = 1/2, pb(β) ≡ Px(β) = 1/2.
However, the S-sequences y and x are not combinable. Thus ob-
servables a and b are not statistically compatible; for example, the
frequency probability P(1, 1) does not exist.17
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